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Congressmen often claim to dislike restrictions on their 
opportuni ties to offer amendments to l egislation in the Committee of 
th e Whol e .  Yet r estrictive rules o f  various forms not only are quite 
common but often are voted into existence expl icitly or implici tl y ,  
Whenever a modified closed rule from the Rules Committee receives a 
majority vote, members explici tl y  accept the restrictions that such 
rules place on amendments ,  Whenever a bil 1 i s  passed under suspension
of the rules, the requisite two-thirds vote is an implicit acceptance 
of restrictions, because the vote has the effect of not only passing 
the legislati on, but passing it unamended, The frequency with which 
such procedures are used in the House of Representatives suggests that 
restrictions on the abil ity to amend are not abhorred after all , 1 
Thus the question :  why do members o f  a democratic and decentral ized 
legislature tolerate, indeed choose, restrictive rules? 
This paper addresses the question with a simple theoretical model 
based on a large clas s of empirical situati ons, The central argument 
is that restrictive rules are effective institutional devices for 
congressmen t o  initiate and maintain pareto optimal outcomes in areas 
*The comments of Bruce Cain, Rod Kiewiet ,  Ken Koford, Dick McKelvey,
Barry Weingast ,  and especially Tom Gilligan are gratefully 
acknowledged . Additional comments are welcome. 
of policy where, in the absence of such rules, initiation and 
maintenance of policies woul d be difficul t .  
I.  RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST RESTRICTIVE RULES 
Consider first the reasons for expecting members to oppose 
restrictive rules.  In the simplest case of a unidimensional 
jurisdiction for a commi ttee with monopoly proposal power, a majority 
on the floor will never prefer a closed to an open rul e .  The open 
rule yields a median voter outcome ( Black, 1 94 8 ) ,  but under a closed 
rul e there may exist situations that are ripe for sophisticated 
placement , al lowing a sophisticated committee to report a bill that 
its majority prefers to the sole alternative under the pure closed 
rule ,  namely the status quo point . 2 To a majority on the floor, the
obj ectionable consequence of the restrictive rule is a policy loss 
equal to the distance between the bil l  and the median voter ' s  ideal 
point . 
( figure 1 )  
Theoreti cal ly grounded opposition t o  restrictive rules is less 
common (or less frequently voi ced ) than opposition based on normative 
principles, in which case the procedures in question often are dubbed 
"gag rules " ( Gall oway, 1 946; Robinson, 1 963) . Examples of opposition 
to such rules abound, a recent case of which was Rules Committee 
Chail"lllan Richard Bolling ' s  response to the relatively closed procedure 
that culminated in President Reagan's successful use of reconcil iation 
in the 1 981 budget process, Bolling called it "an attempt to 
tyrannize a whole Congress, a whole people , , " ( LeLoup, 1 982> . 3 
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But an empirical fac t undermines, if not contradicts, arguments 
agai nst restrictive rules : congressional procedures that restrict 
members ' floor strategies are common, especially in the House ( Bach, 
3 
1 981a, b) , and especially for legislation originating from the House ' s  
"power committees" -- in particular Ways and Means. 4 The conventional 
wisdom is that the special cases are attributable to "complexity of 
the issues" (Robinson, 1 963; Manley , 1 97 3; Fenno, 1 97 3; Reese , 1 980) , 
and the common suppor ting evidence is Howard Smith's often quoted 
claim that "it is impossi ble to write a tax bill on the floor" 
( Congressional Record , 7 6 th Congress , 3 rd Sess . , p . 1 1 23 3 ) ,  But such 
accounts for restrictive rules are not persuasive in light of 
similarly complex legislation that originates from other committees 
and is not protected by restrictive rules , 5 
The model presented below focuses on types of polici es that are 
empirically associated with restrictive rules -- namely taxes and 
tariffs -- and shows how given the likely configurations of 
preferences on such policies,  the association may not be spurious.  In 
particular , contrary to what members say and what unidimensional 
models show , restrictive rules often yield outcomes �hat are 
majority-preferred (and under some conditions unanimously pr eferred ) 
to outcomes that would result under mor e open procedures . 
Consequently, in the spirit of Mayhew ' s  ( 197 3 )  macro assessment of the 
design of the contemporary Congr ess ,  restrictive rules can be 
interpreted as instances of optimal institutional design in micro, 
bill-specific se ttings , 6 
II.  A MODEL OF PARTICULARISTIC POLICY-MAKING 
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To simpl i fy exposition, a three-actor ,  three-dimensional model is 
designed to reflect distributive or particularistic pol itics . 
Although il lustrations rather than theorems are presented , the 
examples are usual ly s pecial cases of general resul ts .  Some have been 
proved elsewhere and others can be proved even for situations of more 
act ors and l ea s  restrictive preferences .  The modest objective of this 
rel atively informal treatment is to draw attention to potentially 
important but theoreti cally overlooked institutions, thereby 
suggesting that generalization is worthwhil e .  
Consider a multidimensional jurisdiction in which individual 
dimensions are provisions for particularistic policies : benefits for 
such programs are concentrated in constituencies and coats are 
dis persed throughout the pol ity. Examples include pork barrel 
proj ect s ,  special tax provisions, and perhaps protectionist measures 
for trade. Assume that members have pure particularistic preferences 
over possible outcomes : each member has a unique ideal point at which 
only his consti tuency (distric t ,  primary interest group, major 
industry in his distri ct,  etc . ) is conferred a benefi t ,  for which the 
coat is shared by taxpayers or consumers in the three districts .  As 
illustrated in figure 2 for two act ors with ideal points x1 and x2 , 
indifference curves are assumed to be convex and separable. One would 
expect them to be el lipti cal , too, reflecting the extreme sensitivity 
of a n  MC ' a utility to changes in proj ect levels for his district. 
(figure 2 )  
Figure 2 
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For the three-dimensional case it is useful to partition the set 
of possible outcomes as shown in figure 3, The origin represents no 
proj ects and is denoted x0, M is the pareto surface of a m inimal 
winning coalition of members (a contract curve for any two members in 
figure 3 ) , and U is the pareto surface on which special project s are 
universal ly distributed . Thus M U U is the entire pareto surface , P .
Finally, I i s  the se t of ( interior ) points between x0 and P ,  while E 
is the se t of ( exterior ) points beyond P with respect to x0• Notice
that for any x e I, it is possible to move to an x e P that benefits 
someone and hurts no one . That is , there are cost-free gains from 
project expansion. In contrast,  for x e E, pareto improvements can be 
made by reducing the scale of a proj ect or proj ect s . 7 
( figure 3)  
The model is a s pecial spatial case of those formal ized or 
discussed in several other works on distributive pol itics , including 
Tul lock ( 1 97 0 ) , Weingast ( 1 97 9) , Shepsle and Weingast ( 19 81 ) ,  
Ferejohn,  Fiorina and McKelvey ( 1 983 ) , and Koford ( 19 85 ) . 
Institutional modifications eventually turn out to be significant, but 
a first step is to reco nsider some earlier results in the context of 
particularistic pol icy. 
Unpredictability in Institution-Free Settings 
A well-known general resul t applicable to the configuration in 
figure 3 is : 
( 2 . 1 )  Under pure majority rule (PMR )  and myopic voting (MV) , an 
equil ibrium "almost never" exis t s .  8 
Figure 3 
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Suppose the status q uo .is at the origin, x0• Then many positive
changes of policy al ong two dimensions will be supported by two 
members (such as b1 in figure 3) , and many positive changes al ong al l 
three dimensions wil l be unanimously preferred to x0 (such as b2 ) .
Simil arl y ,  for any x e I ,  many increases in any two or all three 
provisions wil l attract majority or unanimous coalitions, 
respectively . Thus there seems to be a natural tendency for 
l oopholes,  pork, and protection, at least until a point on the pareto 
surface is selected . 
But the chaos theorems state that in all but the most extPeme 
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circumstances (Plott,  1 967 ) , no such poi nts are stable, not even those 
unanimously preferred to x0, Alternatively stated , for any given
point x, its "majority win set" W(x ) -- defined as the se t of points 
that can defeat x (Shepsle and Weingast,  1 984a) is almost surely 
nonempty . Therefore, temptations for majority coalitions to upset 
even pareto allocations are omnipresent, 
These results are not necessarily harbingers of chaos, as 
McKelvey shows by proving that a uniquely sophisticated agenda setter 
coul d design an agenda that would guarantee selection of his ideal 
poi nt. But for the most part the set of assumptions responsible for 
such resul ts is congressionally impl ausible. Congressmen probably are 
not myopic; they often have and use knowledge about the sequence of 
for thcoming votes; and such votes are ordered i n  a variety of ways 
(one bil l at a time, one section at a time , at most four proposals on 
the floor at a time, etc, ) ,  How, then, might the basic institution-
free spatial model be adapted for more realistic congressional 
appl ications? 
Stability of the Origin under Minimal Institutionalization 
A mild al teration of assumptions is sufficient to i nduce 
stabil i t y .  Suppose first that t h e  rules of t h e  House permit 
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amendments th at change policy in only one dimension at a time. Define 
this procedure as an unidimensionally open rule (UOR ) . UOR can be 
thought of as voting one issue at a time, and resembles amendments 
that are sometimes offered to particularistic l egislation, such as to 
terminate funding for the Clinch River breeder reactor or to exempt 
tuna from free tr ade provisions. The resul t is : 
( 2. 2 )  Under myopic voting (MV ) and unidimensionally open rule 
(UOR ) , x0 is an equil i brium . 
If actors are myopic ,  then any permissible motion to initiate a 
particularistic project fail s ,  since with pure particularistic 
preferences only one member supports the project while everyone else 
opposes i t .  This resul t i s  il lustrated in figure 4 ,  a two-dimensional 
example with three actors' ideal points. Poi nt x is the intersection 
of the dimensi on by dimension median ideal poi nts . The shaded petals 
denote points that can be reached from point x by majority vote. 
Notice, however , that no such points can be reached in a 
unidimensional move, because the intersection between W(x ) and the two 
lines passing through x parallel to the axes contain only x i tsel f, 
(figure 4) 
median 
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The same resul t can be visualized in three dimensions for the 
case of pure parti cularistic preferences . The analogous intersection 
of medians is the origin (x0 ) ,  and the set of permissible amendments 
to x0 under UOR is represented by the three axes. In three 
dimensions, W(x0 ) has the shape of a fat cigar . Because its only
point of intersection with an axis is at the ti p of the cigar that 
touches x0 , x0 is stable under myopic voting.
Not only is x0 stable; it al so exhibits properties of attraction.
Suppose x e I. Agai n, any and all single-project increases fail , but 
in contrast any proposed decrease passes . And the same would be true 
for x e P or x e E .  Thus the minimal imposi tion o f  instituti onal 
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structure in the form of UOR, reverses the initial , institution-free 
resul t s :  now there i s  order where previously there was chaos,  and now 
particularism is nonexistent where previously it was rampant (al bei t 
unstable ) .  
The same result -- stabil ity a t  the origin -- can be at tained 
with a di fferent and more realistic set of assumptions when the model 
is co nsidered as a special case of that studied by Kramer (1 97 2 ) . 
( 2 . 3 )  Under sophisticated voting (SV ) , a unidimensionally open 
rule (UOR ) , and an exogenous agenda (ExA ) , x0 is a unique 
equilibrium . 
Al though Kramer's model is more general than the model of pure 
particularistic preferences, the essential simil arities are that UOR 
and ExA in the present model are consistent with Kramer's formul ation 
of bil l s .  Each o f  Kramer's bil l s  concerns "a single issue or 
dimension", and bil l s  are "voted on independently , one at a time, in 
some specified order which is given in advance" (p , 1 6 8) , In turn,  
his characterization guarantees that "In extensive form the game can 
be represented as a tree" (p.  1 6 9) . 
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Result ( 2 . 3 )  is difficul t to represent spatial ly , but in the 
fol lowing section it is examined more closely using a decision tree. 
At present , however , it suffices to note that the behavioral 
motivation for the resul t stems from members' knowing and 
understanding the myopic case (resul t 2 . 2 ) . Speci fical ly, they know 
that x0 is uniquely stable and that selection of any other point would
not be stabl e .  They then consider these facts simultaneously with 
some known agenda containing x0 and only unidimensional changes. 
Kramer proved that under such circumstances sophisticated voters 
always select x0 -- an outcome that is particularly counterintuitive
in the case of particularistic preferences . 
Thus theory suggests that either of two sets of conditions induce 
stabil ity : MV and UOR; or SV, UOR, and ExA . 9 When congressional l y
motivated and applied, these resul ts are both encouraging and 
problemati c .  The encouraging implication elegantly presented 
el sewhere (Shepsle, 1 979; Riker , 1 980) -- is that the formal 
co nsideration of institutions bodes well for a science of politics 
that focuses on prediction of stable outcomes . But the problem is 
severe in terms of the fit between the theories and congressional 
decision-making . In shor t ,  theory yields either no equilibria or bad 
equilibria -- chaos in PMR models and empirically unsatisfying 
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outcomes in UOR models. Regarding the latter , we do not observe zero 
al locations of pork (Maass ,  1 951; Ferej ohn, 1 974; Weingast , 1 979),  nor 
do we observe a tax code without special provisions (Surrey , 1 957; 
Manl ey , 1 970; Reese , 1 980) . And al though in the post-Depression years 
there has been a tendency towards lower tariffs, it may be offset by 
the concomitant increase in nontariff protection, such as quotas and 
direct subsidies (Spero, 1 985; Pastor 1 980 ) . 
The remainder of the paper focuses on the policy is sues in which 
the predicti on of x0 is incorrec t .  Related q uestions fal l into two 
categories which are the subjects of sections III and IV . The first 
question -- How are such policies initiated? -- is spatiall y  
equivalent to moving away from the origin .  The second q uestion - - How 
are such policies mai ntained? -- is spatially tantamount to finding a 
stable point, preferably on the pareto surface . All subsequent 
demonstrations presume that congressmen have pure particularistic 
preferences. The primary focus is on institutional features that 
illuminate the rationale for restrictive rules. 
III. INITIATING PARTICULARISTIC POLICIES
Suppose that the l egislature has a unidimensional ly open rule and 
that the initial policy is no project s ,  where "project s" is a generic 
term for particularistic pol icies . As demonstrated above, under 
myopic voting there exists no permissible motion that can receive a 
maj ori ty .  But suppose that after a few failing attempts t o  pass 
legislation MCs attempt to devise a way to pass a majority-preferred 
program without violating UOR. What strategies or institutions might 
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they adopt or employ? Cooperative behavior and l ogrol l i ng are 
plausible strategic answers.  The committee system is the basis for an 
insti tuti onal answer. 
Cooperative Behavior and Logrolling 
Logrol l ing i s  a seemingly reasonable explanation for initiation 
of particul aristic policies (Tul lock, 1 97 0; Riker and Brams, 1 97 3; 
Schwart z ,  1 977 ) . For example, members 1 and 2 may agree to expl oit 
the taxpayers in 3 's district by passing a law that co nfers benefits 
to di stricts 1 and 2 but not to district 3 ,  whose members nevertheless 
pay a portion of the bil l .  But there are some hidden problems with 
this expl anation. First , under UOR, an agenda is required for the 
l ogrol l to be constructed. In this example the agenda might be to 
vote for an increase in x1 first and then to vote for an increase in
x2 (or vice versa ) .  But i f  members 1 and 2 indeed decide t o  l ogrol l ,
then the separate votes would provide a strong temptation for the 
representative of the initially funded district to renege , leaving 
x=<x1 , o, O ) , with x1 > o. Indeed such behavior violates Kramer's 
assumption of sophisticated voting, which of course is a 
noncooperative strategy. Implementation of a logrol l under UOR 
therefore seems to require some form of cooperative behavior . 
Theoretical accounts of when cooperation emerges typically 
incorporate long-term costs and benefits and the possi bil ity of 
repeated pl ay. Axelrod (1982 )  shows that cooperation is an effective 
strategy in r epeated play two-person prisoner's dilemma games when 
players' discount rates are sufficiently smal l .  Enel ow (1985)  focuses 
more specifically on legislatures , showing how , under UOR and the 
possibility of revoting, a special type of risk-averse rational 
expectations legisla tors can implement stable l ogrol l s .  
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The incorporation o f  long-term considerations is theoreti cal ly 
useful and legislatively plausible, but a scientific problem 
accompanies these explanations. How can the theories be falsi fied? 
For example,  if cooperation is observed, the inference is that 
discount rates are i ndeed sufficiently smal l ,  so the theory is not 
rejected . If cooperation is not observed , the inference is that 
discount rates are too large,  but the theory is stil l not rejected . 
Fal sification, then, seems to depend upon measuring a phenomenon 
(discount rates ) which is not easily measured using existing 
techniq ues . .Granted , if repeated observations turn up no instances in 
which cooperation or logrol ling attempts failed ,  then there is 
implicit reason to believe that discount rates are sufficiently low 
and/or legisla tors are indeed of the posited rational-expectations 
form . Strictly speaking, however , a single instance of a cooperative 
agreement failing, such as the gut ting of a particul aristic bil l on 
the floor , demonstrates that the necessary conditions are not always 
met .  For example, when the House considered domestic co ntent 
legislation (H. R .  1 23 4 )  in 1 982 , amendments to dilute the 
particul aristic provisions were proposed and the bil l was indeed 
gut ted (Hansen, 1 9 85 ) . Thus cooperative expl anations for implementing 
particularistic policies appear valid only sometimes , and it is 
difficul t empirical ly to determine when. 
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Final ly, suppose it could be verified that the conditions of such 
theories are empirical ly common, even if not universal . Stil l ,  if at 
any given time the conditions were pertur bed beyond a critical point, 
the instability problem returns immediately. Whenever project renewal 
is considered, the opportunity to break the prior agreement presents 
itsel f anew . Member 3 ,  for exampl e ,  can offer 1 a significantly 
larger allocation in exchange for a relatively smal l one. As shown in 
figure 5, for a sufficiently large increment ,  6, member 1 woul d almost 
surely join a hopeful 3 in voting for x = (x1 +6, x2 , o) , after which he 
would kiss good-bye his. erstwhile bedfellow, 2 ,  supporting (again with 
3 )  x = <x1 +6, 0 , 0) ,  Then he would perhaps reward 3 with a final,
unidimensional change to x = (x1 +1) , 0 , x3 ) .  If instead he were to
refuse to complete the deal , there can be l ittle doubt what the next 
motion would be : x = x0 
= 
( 0 , 0 , 0 ) . To summarize: 
(3 . 1 )  Logrol ls are sufficient for initiation o f  particularistic 
pol icies, but they require additional sets of conditions 
that guarantee cooperative behavior (such as Axel rod's) or 
cooperative-looking outcomes (such as Enel ow's ) .  
(figure 5 )  
If these additional conditions are not met ,  the substantive 
implications are clear : particularistic policies are l ikel y  to 
unr avel back t o  the origin .  The strong tendency towards this outcome 
is easily illustrated by pure particularistic preferences. No matter 
which coalition forms to gain benefits, a motion t o  strip or reduce a 
single provision always has a natural maj ority of N-1 .  Thus, for the 
coalition to hold together , cooperation somehow must be induced from 
Figure 5 
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approximately half the members, on every such vote . This seems 
unlikely to occur . But perhaps institutional features of Congress 
facilitate behavior which , if not cooperative, at least results in 
cooperative-looking outcomes, 
Committees and Commodity Bundling. 
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In addition to the empirically el usive assumptions required for 
explanations for implementing particularistic policies, several 
cooperative theories are al so limited in terms of predicting outcomes, 
They predict that coal itions of a certain size forms (e . g . , Riker 
1 96 2 ,  Weingast 1 97 9 ,  Shepsle and Weingast ,  1981 ) , but nei ther which 
coal ition forms nor what its members receive. In contr ast , an 
insti tutional explanation based on standing committees and the 
associa ted jurisdicti onal system in Congress does not suffer from this 
problem . 
The insti tuti onal explanation for implementing particularistic 
policies is theoretically analogous to the second form of Mackay and 
Weaver's (1983 ) commodity bundling in which an agenda setter proposes 
to a set of voters a "bundle" that specifies a budget level and mix. 
Although under UOR no such bundle may be proposed in a single step , 
bil ls reported to the parent body by co ngressional committees may be 
interpreted as s uch . When the House takes up the question of special 
provisions in the tax code , for example ,  the starting point is not the 
origin, as in figure 5 ,  after which individual provisions are proposed 
sequentially. Rather, a bil l will have been reported by the Ways and 
Means Committee calling for the adoption of several such provisions. 
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No individual could propose such a bill o n  the floor as a n  amendment 
to the status q uo ,  since it would violate the unidimensional ity 
restriction in UOR. Nor could a member offer an al ternative bundle as 
a rider to a substantively distinct piece of legislation, as is often 
done in the Sena te, To do so woul d violate the House's germaneness 
rule and thus be subject to a point of order . In contr ast , if the 
committee's bill is the starting point and the special rule assigned 
to legisl ation is not closed, then members could offer amendments to 
increase , decrease, maintain, terminate or initiate single 
particul arisitic provisions . 
Theoretical ly, this is a foolproof way to move from the origin 
without the additional assumptions required for insti tution-free 
logrol ling . There is no £ priori cooperative agreement from which to
renege when considering a commodi ty bundled bil l ,  nor is there an 
incentive for members whose districts receive project s t o  oppose the 
movement from the origin (assuming the commodities in the commit tee's 
jurisdiction were appropriately bundled ) ,  Fur thermore ,  it is 
potentially possible to define commit tee-sophisti cated com�odity 
bundling and to predict commit tee behavior , at least when the rule on 
the floor is fully restrictive (i . e .  PCR ) .  Suppose member 2 
represents the committee that has jurisdiction (monopoly proposal and 
veto power ) over the three-dimensional space . 10 His objective is to
maximize his util ity subject to the constraint that his proposal 
receives a maj ority on the floor . His solution is represented i n  
figure 6 b y  bills (or bundles ) b3 and b1 , These policies are barely 
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preferred to x0 by members 3 and 1, respectively, and therefore can be 
implemented . Thus the noncooperative answer to the problem of 
ini tiation:  
( 3 . 2 )  Commodity bundling by committees (CBC) is sufficient for 
initiating particularistic polici es.  
(figure 6)  
Commodity bundling by standing commit tees is not only a 
theoretically sufficient but also an empirically plausible 
insti tution-based strategy for initiating particularistic policies. 
But although CBC can ensure a majority (or possi bly unanimous )  vote on 
an x e P, there is nothing in the present model to guarantee that such 
an x is resistant to subsequent amendments, 
IV . MAINTAINING PARTICULARISTIC POLICIES 
Suppose a CBC bill reaches the floor . Existing theory says one 
of two things will happen, neither of which co nforms with observations 
of Congress .  Firs t ,  i n  the absence o f  rules restricting amendments,  
outcomes will be unstable. Second, in the presence of minimal 
restri ctions, such as UOR, policy will gravitate to the origin, x0• 
The basis for the latter result ( 2.3 abov e )  is worth restati ng :  the 
existence and uniqueness of an equili brium at the intersection of 
medi ans means that under UOR and sophisticated voting over an 
exogenous agenda on which x0 appears, x0 is the outcome. This section
addresses the puzzle of why this theoretical result is empirically 
rare . More precisely, why do the assumptions of Kramer' s model 
x3 
Figur-e 6 
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necessitate "no project" outcomes, and in what important respects do 
congressional consideration of particularistic policies di ffer from 
the model? 
The Theoretical Attractiveness of x0, 
The assumptions of UOR, SV, and ExA in result (2,3 ) are all 
impor tant , of course , but which one can be most realistically and 
productively adjusted? The mul ti-stage game representation used by 
McKel vey and Niemi ( 1 97 8) not only hel ps to il lustrate the resul t and 
emphasize its counterintuitiveness, but also ul timately isolates its 
mai n empirical shortcoming, Consider figure 7 in which projects are 
dichotomous . The ini tial al ternative under consideration is the 
universal allocation, denoted (11 1 ) ,  where 1 indicates the presence of 
a project for a district . The agenda , under UOR, is to strip project s 
1 ,  2 ,  and 3 ,  respectively, ( The outcome would be no different if the 
starting point were a nonuniversalistic allocation and the agenda also 
contained motions to add project s . ) By assumption, members envision 
the entire tree and examine the possibilities working from the bottom 
up, computing "sophisticated equivalents" at each division ( see 
McKel vey and Niem i ,  1 97 8) . Sophisticated voti ng ,  then, amounts to 
sincere choices among sophisticated equivalents ( shown in square 
brackets ) at each node -- not among the sincere or myopic al ternatives 
( in parentheses ) ,  
( figure 7 )  
Applied t o  pure particularistic preferences, Kramer's resul t 
means that whenever x0 = ( 0 , 0 , 0 )  is on the agenda, sophisticated 
( 11 j) 
[!!OJ 
( 111) 
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[100] 
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Figure 7 
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voters 
sel ect it. Real iz e ,  however , that the process is not restrictiv e ,  
actors are forsightful , yet the outcome is highly undesirable. In the 
case of three actors and dichotanous issues, any two-project bundl e is 
maj ority-preferred , and the universal annibus may be unanimousl y 
preferred to the theor etically inevitable Kramer-McKel vey-Niemi 
sophisticated outcome. What,  then, is the catch? 
When contempl ati ng the key conditions in Kramer's resul t -­
sophisticated voting ,  exogenous agendas and UOR -- skeptics of 
applica tions of formal theories to legislatures are most l ikely to 
chal lenge the assumption of sophisticated voting. But this is not 
productive in the present setting because myopic voting al so l eads to 
x0 (recal l resul t 2 . 2  and see figure 7 ) . Consequently , the probl em of
maintaining particulari stic policies is addressed by jointly examining 
agendas and rul es. 
Agendas and Rules. 
In theor y ,  sophisticated voters must be fully informed about the 
decision tree , which is the formal representation of the agenda. In 
practice this is tantamount to knowing the order and contents of 
amendments that are considered on the floor. In the contemporary 
House , the Rules Commit tee often determines the form and contents of 
the amendment tree. The tools in its insti tutional bag of tricks are 
limited only by what a majority of members will approve. 11 
Historica l l y ,  the most extreme form of what members would approve 
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is the pure closed rule (PCR ) , Result ( 3 . 2 )  was that commodity 
bundling is sufficient for ini tiation of a pareto pol icy. In the 
context of the agendas in the Kramer model , it is easy to see why PCR 
is an effective device for policy initiation. Under PCR there is no 
confusion about the agenda. The outcome is either the bil l  or the 
status q uo ,  and even if the status quo is x0 , a properly packaged bill
passes. (Notice al so that the vote on the rule passes for precisely 
the same reason the bill passes. Thus the endogeneity of actual rule 
making in the House does not necessarily undermine the theory. ) 
But the resul t is more powerful than presented above. Extended 
to multiple sessions of decision-making , PCR also ensures stability of 
the outcome, the substantive equival ent of which is maintenance of the 
policy. Given a winning bil l on the pareto frontier at time t, one of 
two things happens during the next session, t+l. If the status q uo is 
x0 (projects cease to be funded if a new bil l is not passed ) ,  then the 
committee re-reports a similarly or identically bundled bil l at t+ l ,  
t+2 , and s o  on. Changes occur only as a function of changes in 
preferences of commit tee members and/or members on the floor whose 
preferences are taken into account during committee decision-making. 
Alternatively ,  if the status q uo is the last-passed bil l ,  such as with 
the federal tax code which does not expi re, the commit tee obstructs 
subsequent legislation. In either case stability is achieved, If 
additional ly either of these processes produced an x e P ,  the problem 
of nonpareto outcomes under nonrestrictive rules is solve d ,  too. 
Thus : 
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( 4 . 1 )  Commodi ty bundl ing by committees (CBC) and the pure closed 
rule (PCR ) are sufficient for maintaining pareto 
particularistic policies. 
But PCRs are considered brutal solutions to the problem . Indeed , 
opposi tion to such rules prompted Democrats to make a rules change in 
1 97 3  th at permits the Democratic Caucus to instruct the Democratic 
members on the Rules Committee to permit floor consideration of 
specified amendments . The corresponding theoretical question is 
whether it is possible to relax the assumption of PCR without 
returning to UDR and its associated problems, but nevertheless to 
mai ntai n stability? Again, the clue for the useful theoretical 
modi fication comes from the Rules Committee. The relevant 
institutional device is a modified closed rule (MCR ) . The Rules 
Committee h as made frequent use of MCRs for several reasons, the most 
common of which are overl apping j urisdictions and mul tiple referrals 
resul ting from reforms of the early '7 0s . 1 2  Normal features of such
rules incl ude : 
1 .  specification of permissible amendments,  
'1.  specification of members who may offer the amendments,
3 ,  prohibition of second degree amendments, 
4 .  requirement that amendments be printed in the Record, 
5 .  specification of the order of amendments, 
6 .  permission that committee amendments be offered en bloc, and 
7 .  prohibition of motions to divide the question. 1 3
Provisions 1-5 make plausible the argument that under a 
sufficiently specific MCR members have the necessary information to 
behave as i f  they correctly envision the agenda tree. Provisions 6 
21 
and 7 also refine thei r expectations insofar as amendments offered en 
bloc restrict the number of branches of the agenda tree, and exclusion 
of motions to divide the question ensures that the tree stays 
relatively neat.  In sum, aside from their restrictiveness, the common 
element of the provisions in modified closed rules is the certainty 
they impose on the amendment process .  Carefully constructed MCRs make 
it possible for members to envision the entire agenda tree and thus to 
vote sophistica tedly .  Knowing this, Rules Commit tee members can 
predict outcomes associ ated with various MCRs and , in conjunction with 
leaders from the reporting committee, select an MCR that yields a 
pareto outcome. But impor tantly ,  under a wel l-constructed MCR , votes 
on amendments may occur on the floor with minimal danger of retreat to 
x0, Although such rules are somewhat restrictive they can hardly be 
called "gag rules, " Furthermore, they are potential solutions t o  the 
puzzle of maintaining pareto policies . 
But since no assumption in the Kramer model has been viol ated 
yet, MCRs have not been shown to be theoretical ly sound solutions t o  
the problem introduced in section I I .  It is increasingly evident, 
however , that if a solution with an empirically plausible basis 
exists, it is l ikely to be found by looking more closely at the rules 
of the House. 
MCRs as Solutions to the Problem of Nonpareto Policies . 
Given that MCRs can define tidy agendas, the final missing l ink 
concerns the status q uo ,  more specifical ly,  whether or not it is x0 
(no projects )  and where and how it enters the formal agenda , In the 
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case of the House, the latter question has a cleaner answer which can 
be stated generically as voting the status .!lliQ last (VSQL) ,14 With
few exceptions, the final stage in the legisl ative process consists of 
implicitly comparing the status quo with the bil l (if and as amended ) .  
Examples include the motions t o  table or to strike the enacting clause 
(either of which kil ls the bil l ) , the motion to recommit (which c<>.n 
have a variety of effects but at minimum defers further 
co nsideration ) , and, most drastically, the motion to adj ourn sine die 
(which ends the session and kil l s  al l bil ls ) , Associated with these 
procedures are two theoretical possibil ities . First , if x0 is not the
status q uo (s uggesting that the l ast-passed l aw will not expire upon 
failure to pass the present one) , then x0 easily can be excluded from 
the agenda . The Rules Commit tee simply writes an MCR that does not 
provide for a vote on "no projects . "  In contrast , if the practical 
effect of not passing a bill is no project s ,  such as when funding for 
particularistic pol icies expires in the absence of a new 
appropriation, then VSQL al ong with an appropriately constructed MCR 
has the effect of giving the members a chance to choose expl icitly 
between its amended bil l and the al ternative of no projec t s .  Thus, 
( 4 . 2 )  Voting the status quo last (VSQ L )  and a modified closed 
rule (MCR ) are sufficient conditions for maintaining 
pareto particularistic policies, 
Figure 8 illustrates the significance of the motion to recommit 
as an instance of VSQL, The agenda is identical to that of figure 7, 
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except that a motion t o  recommit is in order at the terminal node . 
(MCRs sometimes designate a member , usually from the reporting 
committee, to make such a motion. ) When recommital is tantamount to 
kil ling the bil l and l eaving intact the non-x0 status quo -- such as
on trade and tax legislation -- it can effectively nul lify departures 
from the pareto surface . Suppose that in this case members were 
indeed Kramer-McKelvey-Niemi sophisticated and predictably ended up a t  
x0• The motion to recommit would then be offered and passed, leaving
present pol icy unchanged . In sum, added to the simpl icity of the 
agenda a t tributable to the MCR, the motion to recommit reverses the 
Kramer result and makes possible maintenance of a pareto pol icy . 
(figure 8 ) 
Of course , if members can compute sophisticated equivalents, then 
so too can they incorporate VSQL into such strategies . When this 
occurs, the outcome is agenda-specific . But in any agenda that 
contains a proposal in which at least a majority of members receive 
allocations, x0 cannot win, To see why, examine the VSQL
sophisticated equival ents shown in brackets in figure 8 .  I n  this 
simple case of dichotomous project s ,  the resul t is indeterminate, but 
with a noteworthy regul arity . All VSQL sophisticated equivalents at 
the top of the tree are minimal winning al locations, consistent with 
the general resul ts of Ferej ohn, Fiorina and McKelvey ( 1 9 83 )  . 1 5  As
they note, this prediction does not co nform particularly wel l with 
congressional policy . But prior model s that yielded minimal winning 
coalition resul ts either were silent about formal agendas (e . g . Riker , 
Figure 8 
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1 96 2 )  or provided for rel atively unrestricted amendment processes 
(Kramer , 1 972; Ferejohn et al, , 1 983) ,  Modified cl osed rul e s ,  in 
contrast , provide for a wealth of alternative strategic opportuni ties, 
principal ly for the Rules Committee, For exampl e ,  the Rules Committee 
easily can write an MCR th at yields a pareto outcome, If the status 
quo is not x0 , then the Rules Committee can write an MCR that keeps x0 
off the agenda.  Or , if the status q uo is x0 , the Rules Commit tee can
write an MCR in which UOR is violated at the final division in the 
formal agenda tree. In either case , not only is the Kramer resul t 
precluded, but the agenda setting opportuni ties of the Rules Committee 
make possibl e greater than minimal winning, or even universal istic ,  
allocations � something that w e  regularly observe but that 
noncooperative models have not yet yielded. 
Thus far the argument in this section has rested on strong 
informational assumptions. These are not necessarily bothersome i f  
MCRs restrict and order the number o f  amendments so that members can 
anticipate various contingencies and vote accordingly. But in a l ess 
tidy world members sometimes make mistakes or , due to consti tuency 
pressures, are not free to vote sophisticatedly even if they know how 
to (Denzau , Riker and Shepsl e ,  1 985 ) . VSQL is al so useful here, apart 
from its aforementioned effect on calculation of sophisticated 
strategies in se ttings of precisely defined agendas, perfect 
information, and no constituency constrai nts. Its secondary function 
is th at of a corrective device, Suppose that an MCR provides for 
several amendments and that the floor procedure becomes more 
compl icated than anticipated, On the way down the tree several 
amendments pass unexpectedly .  By the time the penultimate node is 
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reached , the bil l is gutted, For the bill to become law ,  it is still 
necessary for the Committee of the Whol e to rise and vote on final 
passage . But at this stage a motion to table would kil l the bil l ,  as 
of course would a negative vote on final passage, In either case the 
status q uo is restored, and , if the status quo is restoration of past 
pol icy as opposed to reversion to no project s ,  a point on the pareto 
surface is maintained . 
Simil arl y ,  but with l ess final ity , a motion to recommit (perhaps 
with instructions) l6 sends the gutted bill back to commit tee and keeps
alive the possibility for r econsideration in the same session. The 
repor ting committee and the Rules Committee are then free to repackage 
th e legislation and rewrite the rule such that unraveling is less 
l ikely to occur the second time around . In short and in sum, Congr ess 
not only has methods such as MCRs that facilitate the initiation and 
maintenance of pareto policies; it also has institutional escape 
h atches to minimize the damage when the pr imary devices fail . 
V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The primary objective of this essay was to propose an answer to 
the question of why congressmen tolerate and often choose restrictive 
rules, A spa tial model of particularistic policy-making was used to 
address the question by focusing on conditions under whibh 
particularistic policies can be impl emented and maintained, 
Restrictive rules were shown to be sufficient conditions under 
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s pecified congressional institutional arrangements. The puzzl ing 
popularity of restrictive rules therefore may be attributable to their 
effects on policy outcomes, 
The particular form of restrictive rules (MCR s )  discussed rath er 
informally in section IV is l ikely to have a more rigorous theoretical 
basis .than is suggested by the simpl e resul ts from the spatial model . 
If indeed modified closed rules are empirical ly important cases of 
theoretical agendas, then continued study of MCRs should reveal a 
close connection between alternatives in the uncovered se t (Miller,  
1 980; Shepsle and Weingas t ,  1 9 84b; McKel vey , 1 986)  and the strategic 
possibilities of the Rules Commit tee using MCRs, For exampl e ,  Shepsle 
and Weingast prove the following : 
( 5 . 1 )  The uncovered se t is contained in the pareto optimal set, 
( proposition 3 ,  p .  6 5 )  
( 5 . 2 )  There exists a n  agenda that can ge t fror
7
y to x if and 
only if x is uncovered by y ,  i . e .  -yCx. ( theorem 3 ,  
p. 5 9) 
( 5, 3 )  Commencing at y, for any point that is the sophisticated 
agenda equil ibrium ( sae) of some k-step agenda, there is 
an agenda with at most two steps possessing the same sae .  
( corollary 3 . 1 ,  p .  6 2 )  
The theoretical merging of sophisticated voting and the uncovered 
set has impl ications for ( and indeed establ ishes) some of the informal 
assertions in this paper about restrictive rules . Consider a 
commodity bundled bill in the uncovered se t ,  which , by ( 5 . 1 ) , is also 
on the pareto surface, Result ( 5, 2 )  guarantees the existence of an
agenda that makes it possible to depart from any y ( s uch as x0 in the
pr eceding discussion) to an x in the uncovered and pareto optimal 
se ts,  thereby establishing resul t ( 3 .2) , Furthermor e,  ( 5 . 3 )  
guarantees tha t  the Rules Commit tee can write a n  MCR t o  do the j ob 
quickl y .  I f  in practice t h e  Rules Committee i s  reluctant to impose 
such severe restricti ons ,  then it becomes important that uncovered 
al t ernatives h ave the property of rising to the top of the agenda as 
sophisticated equival ents . Under SV one such al ternative is sut•e to 
survive through al l the votes of even a mul ti-stage agenda . A wel l ­
designed MCR , then, c a n  do the j o b  o f  a PCR but without the 
restrictiveness of the l atter . 
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A remaining empirical question is whether congressmen understand 
and expl oi t rules to the degree that the theor e ti cal resul ts suggest 
is possi ble ,  Al though direct empirical tests for the theoreti cal 
propositions implicit in this paper have not been conducted, there is 
some rela ted evidence about the degree of institutional sophistica tion 
in th e legislative arena. A study of tax l egislation in the 93 rd 
Congress provides empirical support for the hypothesis that political 
and economic actors understand the effects of special rules on 
out comes ( Gilligan and Krehbiel , 1 98 5 ) .  A test of a theory of the 
congressional budget process indicates that congressmen also 
understand the effects of al ternative budgetary institutional 
arrangements ( Ferejohn and Krehbiel , 1 98 5 ) . And a study of MCRs in 
particular illustrates their use by the Rules Committee to confer 
nonpolicy benefits in the form of "position-taking opportuni ties" 
( Hansen, 1 98 5 ) ,  For example ,  li beral Democrats who are excluded from 
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the commit tee's bundle can be permit ted t o  offer amendments that add 
provisions for their distri cts . 1 8  Simil arly, conservative , anti-pork
Republicans may be designa ted to offer stripping amendment s . 1 9  But if
the MCR is constructed to allow members t o  see ( figuratively) to the 
end of the tree, a pareto outcome (often greater than minimal winning) 
resul t s .  Furthermore,  if t h e  preferences o f  members remain constant 
over time and the strategies of the Rules Committee are not errati c ,  
t h e  resul t is stabl e ,  
A s  discussed in sectio n  III, al t ernative sets o f  conditions under 
which particularistic policies may be passed include cooperative 
behavior and r ational expectations logrol ling, This paper made no 
attempt to rej ect these explanations nor to offer an exclusive account 
for particularistic policies , Rather , its primary and narrower aim 
was to expose a rati onal e for restrictive rules.  If future studies 
are to address these theories comparatively and empirical ly,  however, 
three points and a hypothesis should be considered . Firs t ,  because 
the theories are motivated by different substantive,interests ( e . g .  
rules , logrolling, cooperation) , they are not readily comparable. 
Thei r maj or if not sole common feature is that the outcomes of 
col lective decision-making wil l appear as if cooperative behavior 
occurred. Second, although the theoretical accounts of such outcomes 
are distinct, the se t of conditions in any given legislative se tti ng 
is likel y to contain some elements of each theory. Therefor e,  the 
theories are not strictly compe ting . Third, this raises a new 
question. Which of the various sufficient conditions for 
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implementation and maintenance of particularistic policies are most 
important, and when? On the basis of the models presented or reviewed 
in this paper, a potentially testable hypothesis emerges. Ceteris 
paribus ,  failure of cooperative agreements ( or of logrol ls)  is more 
common in the absence of restrictive rul es than in their presence.20
Empirical support for this hypothesis would substantiate an 
interpretation of restrictive rul es as institutional protectors of 
ostensibly cooperative outcomes .  
A final implica tion of this rationale for restrictive rul es i s  
th a t  t h e  Rules Commit tee, and agenda se tting ge neral ly,  should be 
reexamined from a more benign perspective . Theoretical studies of 
agenda power are hel pful , and upon first glance their findings are 
consi st ent with the argument here that MCRs provide the Rules 
Committee with great opportuni ties for setting the agenda to obtain 
pol icies that its members want. But such theoretical resul ts are easy 
to overinterpret. 21 MCRs in Congress should not be regarded as blunt
dictatorial i nstruments, even though they may have that theoretical 
potential . The contrasting empirical fact is that the contemporary 
Rul es Commit tee is constrained, even to the point of being considered 
an " arm of the leadership" ( Oppenheimer, 1977) . To the degree that 
l eaders in turn are constrained by the backbenchers who elected them, 
a principal-agent chain from backbenchers to leaders to Rules 
Committee members can be envisioned. Reconsideration of the Rules 
Committee as an agent helps reinforce the central point of this paper. 
Special rul es in general exist and are selected by co ngressmen to help 
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obtain out comes with properties congressmen val ue , Restrictive rul es 
in particular are designed by agents of congressmen because they are 
effective devices for i ni tiating and maintaini ng pareto optimal 
particul aristic policies.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  On the frequency of restrictive rules i n  the House , see Bach 
( 1 981 a , b) for speci al rules and Drew ( 1978 )  for suspension of the 
rules. Similar procedures occur in the Senate , principally 
through the use of unanimous consent agreements. This paper 
focuses on the House , however . 
2 .  Throughout the paper, the status .9..YQ (sometimes called a 
reversion point ) is the outcome that results if no alternative 
receives a requisite number of votes, A pure closed rule ( PCR ) 
is o ne that prohibits all amendments on the floor; a pure open 
rule ( PO R )  permits any amendments.  Situa tions that are ripe for 
sophistica ted placement or ripe for obstruction by a standing 
committee are defined for unidimensional situations in Krehbiel 
( 1 98 6 ) , The closed rule portion of that model resembles Romer 
and Rosenthal ' s  ( 1 978 ) , while open and closed rule parts are very 
similar to Denzau and Mackay's ( 1 98 3 )  model, Other definitions 
and abbr eviations are introduced as the discussion proceeds . 
3 .  Interestingly , a year later Bolling made a strong plea for a 
restrictive rule for a budget resolution that contained 
r econciliation instructions. However, in 1 982 it was the 
Democrats• resoluti on. 
4. The tendency for the Ways and Means Committee to receive closed 
rules diminished somewhat immediately following the reforms of 
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the early 1 97 0s ,  but the reaction of several members was th at the 
restrictions were needed after all, See Rudder ( 197 7 ) .  
5 .  See Fiorina ( 1 982 , pp. 1 5-17 ) for an analogous argument agai nst 
complexity as a r ationale for congressional delegation.  
6. Mayhew's exact passage is:
If a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair 
of American national assemblies with the goal of serving 
members' electoral needs year in and year out , they would be 
hard pressed to improve on what exists (pp,  81-82) . 
7, The pareto surface in the model is "political" rather than 
"economic" in the sense that the ideal points need not be 
generated from a utility function whose only arguments are 
economic costs and benefits to the district , Rather than attempt 
to resolve the question of how best to generate legislator's 
preferences (see, for example, Aranson and Ordeshook, 1 978; 
Shepsle and Weingast, 1 98 4a; Niou and Ordeshook, 1 98 5 ) , I simply 
posit the preferences and note that an x e P in this model need 
not be economically efficient. 
8, See Plott ( 1 967)  for the exceptional case and McKelvey ( 1 97 6 )  for 
a generalization and implica tions. 
9. Only exogenous agendas are considered in this paper, even though 
in the classic case of particularistic policy -- namely, pork 
barrel legislation -- an endogenous agenda model may be more 
3 3  
appropriate. Theoretical guidance on endogenous agendas is 
sparse , however ,  especially if by "endogenous" one means that the 
offering of amendments and the voting on amendments are 
i nt ermixed ( as opposed to constructing the agenda in one stage 
and voti ng on it in a separate, subsequent stage ) .  
1 0. This example does not generalize straightforwardly to more 
actors. With mul tipl e committee members the optimally commodity 
bundled bil l  is more difficul t to define. Various arguments have 
been made to circumvent this predicament, none of which are 
entirely sa tisfactory . Examples i nclude : commit tees are smal l 
groups and thus can come to agreement on bills even in the 
absence of a core; commit tees have chairmen who are in effect 
dictators; and committee members typical ly have homogeneous 
preferences. Regrettably, the anth ropomorphism implicit in the 
example cannot be denied. 
1 1. The flexibility of the Rules Commit tee in devising "special 
orders" ( rules) is compr ehensively co nveyed in Deschler and Brown 
( 1 982) , Chapter 21 , sections 18-21 and Chapter 27. section 2, and 
in Bach ( 1 981 a , b ) .  
1 2. See Bach ( 1 981b)  for a richly illustrated discussion of the 
incr easing use of "restrictive compl ex special rules , " of which 
modified closed rules are examples. 
3 4  
1 3 .  Not every modified closed rule has all of these provisions, but 
most seem to have two or more. Deschler and Brown's ( 1 982) 
Procedure l ists several examples of "rules open in part or closed 
in part "  in chapter 21 , section 1 9 ,  paragraphs 27-46 . 
1 4. My VSQL is similar to Shepsle and Weingast's ( 1 98 4 b )  "backward 
buil t agendas. " In each case the final vote pairs the status quo 
agai nst the bill ( possibly as amended ) .  In my case , however ,  
nothing is assumed about t h e  ordering o f  al t ernatives prior t o  
t h e  final division, whereas in backward-buil t  agendas 
al ternatives are voted on in the exact reverse order in which 
they were proposed. 
15. Their proj ects are not dichotomous ,  and their resul t is that the
cheapest MWC wil l form,
16. Recommit tal with instruction to report forthwith was instrumental 
in the Senate during its consideration of the fiscal 1 98 6  Budge t 
Resolution. See various .QQ§ and Congressional Records throughout 
April and May , 1 985 ( but be warned that it is compl icated ) .  
1 7. The binary covering relation, C, is the basis for the uncovered 
se t. For al l proposals x and y ,  y is said to cover x if and only 
if y is in the set of al t ernatives that beats x, and the set of 
al ternatives that beats y is contai ned in the se t of al ternatives 
that beats x. Formall y .  for al l x ,  y,  yCx iff ( i )  y e  W {x ) ,  and 
( ii) W { y) c W { x ) .  See Shepsle and Weingast { 1 98 4b ) ,  p. 58. 
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1 8 ,  These are designated "posi ti on-taking" amendments because 
formal ly they should not pass.  A majority of N-1 opposes an 
amendment to add a project in which only one member benefits and 
al l others pay . 
1 9 .  These amendments are probably more common for classic pork barrel 
l egi slation, which tends not to be co nsidered under restrictive 
rul es .  This raises the theoretically challenging question of why 
public works l egislation passe s .  See footnote 9 ,  supra, and the 
fol lowing works : Aranson and Ordeshook ( 1 97 8) , Ferejohn Fiorina 
and McKel vey ( 1 983 ) , Koford ( 1 985 ) , Niou and Ordeshook ( 1 985 ) , 
Shepsle and Weingast ( 1 981 a ) , and Weingast ( 1 979,  1 985 ) . 
2 0 .  Due to the endogenei ty of rul es in Congr ess, the ceteris paribus 
qual i fier is critical . A satisfactory test would have to 
confront this compl exity . 
2 1 . See Enelow and Hinich ( 1984) for a revised and uniquely 
co nservative interpretation of agenda control . 
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